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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner railroad Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corporation (“PATH”) challenges a decision and order of 
the Administrative Review Board of the United States 
Department of Labor, which held that PATH violated the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act when it suspended one of its 
employees for excessive absenteeism.  Specifically, 
PATH was held to have violated an anti-retaliation 
provision, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(c)(2), which prohibits 
railroads from disciplining employees “for following 
orders or a treatment plan of a treating physician.”  The 
physician’s order which the employee was following 
related to treatment for an off-duty injury.  Reading 
4 
 
subsection (c)(2) in context, we agree with PATH that 
only physicians’ orders which stem from on-duty injuries 
are covered. 
 Accordingly, we will grant the petition. 
I. 
 Intervenor Christopher Bala is a unionized signal 
repairman who has worked for PATH since 1990.  Per 
PATH’s agreement with Bala’s union, signal repairmen 
of Bala’s seniority are entitled to 12.5 paid holidays and 
23 paid vacation days per year.  Separate from this 
allotment of paid holidays and vacations, Bala took in 
excess of 600 sick and personal days through 2008.1  In 
2007 alone, Bala took 82 sick days, compared to the 17 
days of sick leave per year taken by unionized signalmen 
at PATH, on average, between 2002 and 2008.  As a 
result of these absences, PATH issued numerous 
warnings to Bala over the years that if his attendance did 
not improve formal disciplinary action might be taken. 
 On June 22, 2008, Bala experienced back pain 
while moving boxes at his home.  The next day, Bala’s 
                                              
1 Under the union agreement, if Bala is “prevented from 
performing [his] duties by reason of sickness,” he is to be 
paid in full for up to 65 days of sick leave annually, and 
to receive half-pay for an additional 195 days annually.  
Bala did not bring a claim pursuant to that agreement. 
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physician ordered him off work through July 2008.  On 
July 14, 2008, PATH followed through on its prior 
warnings, and notified Bala that an internal hearing 
would be held regarding his absenteeism.  As a result of 
that hearing, PATH suspended Bala for up to six days 
(partially contingent on improved attendance), without 
pay, for violating PATH’s attendance policy.  The 
suspension was based on the sum total of Bala’s 
absences, including but not limited to those following his 
June 22, 2008 back injury. 
 Bala filed a complaint with the Respondent in this 
case, the United States Secretary of Labor, alleging that 
the suspension was retaliation for taking statutorily 
protected sick leave.  The Federal Railroad Safety Act 
(“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., provides that “[a] 
railroad carrier . . . may not discipline . . . an employee . . 
. for following orders or a treatment plan of a treating 
physician.”  49 U.S.C. § 20109(c)(2).2  Although 
subsection (c)(2) immediately follows a provision 
prohibiting railroads from “deny[ing], delay[ing], or 
                                              
2 Claimants alleging retaliation for taking statutorily 
protected sick leave often rely on the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides workers protected 
sick leave and is accompanied by an anti-retaliation 
provision.  But at oral argument, Bala’s counsel 
expressed some skepticism that Bala would have 
qualified under the FMLA due to his prior absences. 
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interfer[ing] with the medical or first aid treatment of an 
employee who is injured during the course of 
employment,” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(c)(1) (emphasis added), 
Bala argued that subsection (c)(2) applies regardless of 
where an employee is injured.  An Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) agreed and held that PATH violated the 
FRSA by disciplining Bala for following his physician’s 
orders not to work after his off-duty injury,3 and awarded 
Bala just over $1,000 in back pay for the days he was 
suspended.  The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) 
of the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) 
upheld the ALJ’s award in Bala v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., ARB Case No. 12-048, 2013 WL 
5773495 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
 In upholding the award, the ARB rejected PATH’s 
argument that subsection (c)(2) is limited to physicians’ 
orders stemming from on-duty injuries.  However, a mere 
14 months earlier, in Santiago v. Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad Corp., ARB Case No. 10-147, 2012 WL 
3164360 (July 25, 2012), a different ARB panel (albeit 
                                              
3 The ALJ heard arguments that because Bala had 
previously injured his back at work, his subsequent back 
injury at his home constituted an aggravation of an on-
duty injury, and accordingly would still be covered even 
if subsection (c)(2) only applied to on-duty injuries.  As 
this issue was not raised below or to this Court, it is 
waived.   
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comprised of two of the same three members) stated just 
the opposite, that subsection (c)(2) “identifies protected 
activity as . . .  complying with treatment plans for work 
injuries.”  Id. at *5 (emphasis added).  The Bala panel, 
while citing Santiago seven times, failed to address this 
clear contradiction. 
 PATH petitioned this Court to set aside the ARB’s 
decision and order, and presented two questions:  (1) 
whether subsection (c)(2) applies to orders of treating 
physicians that stem from off-duty injuries;  and (2) 
assuming the statute’s application to off-duty injuries, 
whether there was sufficient evidence to find that PATH 
disciplined Bala because of such protected absences.  We 
conclude that Congress intended the entirety of 
subsection 20109(c) to apply only when an employee 
sustains an injury during the course of employment.  It is, 
therefore, unnecessary for us to reach the second question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence.  We will grant 
PATH’s petition. 
II. 
 The ARB had jurisdiction, as delegated to it by the 
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(1).  
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 49 
U.S.C. § 20109(d)(4). 
 We review the ARB’s decision to determine if it 
was, inter alia, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
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discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  See 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Doyle v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 285 
F.3d 243, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2002).  While “we exercise 
plenary review in deciding questions of law,” id. at 249, 
our review is potentially subject to deference under 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  However, “when we 
are called upon to resolve pure questions of law by 
statutory interpretation, we decide the issue de novo 
without deferring to an administrative agency that may 
be involved.”  Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 467 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (superseded by statute on other grounds). 
III. 
 Before the FRSA was amended by the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 (“RSIA”),4 49 U.S.C. § 20109 
                                              
4 Pub. L. No. 110–432, 122 Stat. 4848 (October 16, 
2008).  As the RSIA was passed four months after Bala’s 
injury, the ARB briefly addressed retroactivity concerns 
and held that because Bala’s suspension was not handed 
down until after the statute was passed, there was no 
retroactivity problem.  Since this issue was not raised on 
appeal, it is waived.  Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 
225 (3d Cir. 2008); Ordway v. United States, 908 F.2d 
890, 896 (11th Cir. 1990) (non-retroactivity is an 
affirmative defense which a court need not always 




was exclusively an anti-retaliation provision.  
Subsections (a) and (b) of § 20109 provided (and still 
provide) protections to employees who assist in 
investigations into railroad safety, refuse to violate laws 
pertaining to railroad safety, notify a railroad or the 
Secretary of Transportation about “work-related” injuries 
or illnesses, and report and/or refuse to work in 
hazardous conditions.  The RSIA inserted a new 
subsection (c), containing both an anti-retaliation 
provision, subsection (c)(2), and a more direct worker 
safety provision, subsection (c)(1):  
(c) Prompt medical attention.— 
 (1) Prohibition.--A railroad carrier or 
person covered under this section may not 
deny, delay, or interfere with the medical or 
first aid treatment of an employee who is 
injured during the course of employment. 
If transportation to a hospital is requested by 
an employee who is injured during the 
course of employment, the railroad shall 
promptly arrange to have the injured 
employee transported to the nearest hospital 
where the employee can receive safe and 
appropriate medical care. 
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 (2) Discipline.--A railroad carrier or person 
covered under this section may not 
discipline, or threaten discipline to, an 
employee for requesting medical or first aid 
treatment, or for following orders or a 
treatment plan of a treating physician, 
except that a railroad carrier’s refusal to 
permit an employee to return to work 
following medical treatment shall not be 
considered a violation of this section if the 
refusal is pursuant to Federal Railroad 
Administration medical standards for fitness 
of duty or, if there are no pertinent Federal 
Railroad Administration standards, a 
carrier’s medical standards for fitness for 
duty. For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term “discipline” means to bring charges 
against a person in a disciplinary 
proceeding, suspend, terminate, place on 





49 U.S.C. § 20109(c) (emphasis added).  We are the first 
federal appeals court to consider a case involving this 
subsection.5 
 We are confronted here with a statute that 
specifically references at subsection (c)(1) “injur[ies] 
during the course of employment,” while subsection 
(c)(2) does not.  PATH argues that the “treatment” in 
subsection (c)(2) “refers back” to the “treatment” in 
subsection (c)(1) and thereby incorporates the “during the 
course of employment” limitation into subsection (c)(2).6  
                                              
5 We have previously encountered § 20109 in Araujo v. 
New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152 
(3d Cir. 2013).  There we held that there was enough 
evidence supporting the plaintiff’s retaliation claim for 
reporting a work-related injury under subsection (a)—a 
provision not directly implicated in this case—such that 
summary judgment should not have been granted in favor 
of the defendant railroad. 
6 This is, at the very least, a permissible theory of 
statutory construction.  See, e.g., United States v. Navajo 
Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 299 (2009) (“The ‘program’ twice 
mentioned in § 638 refers back to the Act’s opening 
provision . . . § 631.”); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 
89, 94 (1991) (“The requirement [in (d)(1)(B)] that the 
fee application be filed within 30 days of ‘final judgment 
in the action’ plainly refers back to the ‘civil action ... in 
any court’ in (d)(1)(A).”). 
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The DOL, contending that the two paragraphs are 
“distinct” provisions, argues that the absence of the 
“during the course of employment” limitation in 
subsection (c)(2) reflects a deliberate choice by Congress 
to extend protections even to workers who sustain 
injuries off-duty.  Since, under subsection (c)(2), a 
physician’s order could include a direction that an 
employee not work (as the physician’s order did in this 
case), and because there is no temporal limitation in the 
statute, the DOL’s interpretation would functionally 
confer indefinite sick leave on all railroad employees 
who can obtain a physician’s note.7 
 We agree with PATH that the “during the course 
of employment” limitation applies to subsection (c)(2).  
As we explain below, because subsection (c)(2) is an 
anti-retaliation provision obviously related to subsection 
                                              
7 The fact that railroads may still be able to discipline 
employees who take sick leave in bad faith as well as 
those who take excessive unprotected absences, does not 
negate the existence of indefinite sick leave for 
potentially appreciable numbers of railroad employees.  
Nor does the safe-harbor provision in subsection (c)(2), 
which allows an employer to refuse to permit an 
employee to return to work if s/he does not meet 
applicable medical standards.  That refusal is permissible 
only until the employee meets those standards, at which 
point s/he is entitled to return to work. 
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(c)(1), it should presumptively be interpreted only to 
further the objectives of subsection (c)(1).  The DOL’s 
broad interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would not 
further the objectives of subsection (c)(1), and the DOL 
is unable to rebut the aforementioned presumption. The 
ARB,  relying on Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 
23 (1983), concluded that the absence of any express on-
duty limitation in subsection (c)(2), in contrast to the 
presence of such a limitation in subsection (c)(1), means 
that Congress did not intend for that limitation to apply to 
subsection (c)(2).  But, for reasons we explain below, 
Russello is unhelpful here. 
 Moreover, further examination of the statutory text 
affirmatively supports the conclusion that subsection 
(c)(2) is limited to addressing on-duty injuries.  We do 
recognize that the DOL advances a logical policy 
argument in support of its position:  that railroad safety 
could be threatened if injured workers are pressured to 
return to work by the absence of indefinite sick leave.  
But there is no evidence Congress ever considered that 
reason, and simultaneously-enacted provisions suggest 
that Congress would have written subsection (c)(2) 
differently if that were its intent. 
A. 
 Subsection (c)(1), entitled “Prohibition,” is a 
“substantive provision;” while subsection (c)(2), entitled 
“Discipline,” is an “antiretaliation provision.” 
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 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 
53, 61-62 (2006) (analyzing the relationship between §§ 
703 and 704 of Title VII).  Generally, an “antiretaliation 
provision seeks to secure [the] primary objective” 
advanced by the substantive provision.  Id. at 63.  Cf. 
Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226, 
230 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The anti-retaliation provision is 
included [in the Fair Labor Standards Act], not as a free-
standing protection . . . but rather as an effort ‘to foster a 
climate in which compliance with the substantive 
provisions of the [Act] would be enhanced.’”) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 
293 (1960)). 
 The plain text of subsection (c)(1), which covers 
an “employee who is injured during the course of 
employment,” makes clear that its primary objective is to 
ensure that railroad employees are able to obtain medical 
attention for injuries sustained on-duty.  Subsection 
(c)(2) furthers that objective by encouraging employees 
to take advantage of the medical attention protected by 
subsection (c)(1), without facing reprisal.  Interpreting 
subsection (c)(2) to also cover off-duty injuries would 
not further the purposes of subsection (c)(1), which is 
explicitly limited to on-duty injuries. 
 We think this much is beyond reasonable debate.  
Although the DOL contends that the provisions are 
“distinct,” it does not contest the fact that subsection 
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(c)(2) effectuates the purposes of subsection (c)(1).  Nor 
does the DOL contest the fact that its broad interpretation 
of subsection (c)(2) would not further the purposes of 
subsection (c)(1)—indeed the DOL emphasizes that 
subsection (c)(2)’s protection for following the “orders or 
a treatment plan of a treating physician” is “a distinct 
protection only appearing in subsection (c)(2).”  
Respondent’s Br. at 21 (emphasis added).  So, the real 
issue becomes the extent to which—despite their obvious 
relationship—subsection (c)(2) is a multi-purpose 
provision intended by Congress to also advance an 
objective that is independent from those advanced in 
subsection (c)(1). Consistent with the construction of 
anti-retaliation provisions in general, and in particular 
anti-retaliation provisions immediately following a 
related substantive provision (as in Burlington and here), 
we presume that Congress did not intend subsection 
(c)(2) to be a vehicle for advancing an independent 
objective.8 
                                              
8 See Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 235 (King, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing the majority’s approach as a 
“presum[ption]”).  Of course, we would not allow 
considerations of the purpose of an anti-retaliation 
provision to trump the statute’s text.  For example, we 
recently rejected a rather plausible argument that a 
whistleblower provision would be undermined, in favor 




 As “[t]he best evidence of the purpose of a statute 
is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of 
Congress,” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 599 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal 
brackets omitted) (quoting W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991)), we begin our search for 
evidence that Congress actually intended subsection 
(c)(2) to advance an independent objective by examining 
the textual analysis in the ARB’s decision below.  That 
analysis focused on an extension of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Russello.  “[Russello] set[s] out [a canon of 
interpretation] that ‘where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
                                                                                                     
structure of [the Act].”  Khazin v. TD Ameritrade 
Holding Corp., No. 14-1689, 2014 WL 6871393, at *4 
(3d Cir. Dec. 8, 2014); see also Fogleman v. Mercy 
Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(resolving a conflict between “the overall purpose of the 
anti-retaliation provisions” and their “plain text” in favor 
of the plain text); but cf. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 
121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987) (“It follows that courts 
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision have looked to 
its animating spirit in applying it to activities that might 
not have been explicitly covered by the language.”).   
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inclusion or exclusion.’”  Kapral v. United States, 166 
F.3d 565, 578 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23) (internal brackets 
omitted).  Because subsection (c)(1) is explicitly limited 
to “injur[ies] during the course of employment” and 
subsection (c)(2) is not, applying Russello, the ARB 
concluded that Congress clearly intended subsection 
(c)(2) to apply without such limitation.9  We disagree. 
 At issue in Russello was a Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) forfeiture 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1), which extended to 
“any interest [the person] has acquired or maintained in 
violation of [the RICO statute].”  The petitioner argued 
that one can only have an “interest” in something, and 
that per the language of subsection (a)(1) that interest 
must be an interest in the enterprise itself (and not in 
money or profits derived therefrom).  The Supreme Court 
                                              
9 The ARB’s insistence in this regard is puzzling.  After 
all, not only did it reject the conclusion it now advances 
in Santiago, it also: (i) rejected an ALJ’s application of 
Russello to interpret the relationship between subsections 
(c)(1) and (c)(2);  (ii) observed the “parallel structure” of 
subsections (a), (b) and (c); and (iii) discussed inferring 
statutory references from context—all methodological 
approaches it abandoned below in order to reach its 




rejected that analysis on its face, and then stated:  “[w]e 
are fortified in this conclusion by our examination of the 
structure of the RICO statute.”  464 U.S. at 22.  Unlike 
subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) extended only to 
interests “in . . . any enterprise” which were connected to 
a person’s RICO violation.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
concluded that if Congress wanted to restrict subsection 
(a)(1) to only interests in enterprises, it would have done 
so explicitly as it did in subsection (a)(2). 
 We acknowledge a similarity between this case 
and Russello—but that similarity is superficial.  The 
Russello presumption only applies when two provisions 
are sufficiently distinct that they do not—either explicitly 
or implicitly—incorporate language from the other 
provision.  See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 530 
(2003) (“in Russello . . . [t]he qualifying words ‘in . . . 
any enterprise’ narrowed § 1963(a)(2), but in no way 
affected § 1963(a)(1)” (emphasis added; second omission 
in original)).  Since the critical question here is whether 
subsection (c)(1) operates to cabin the scope of 
subsection (c)(2), Russello can only be meaningfully 
invoked after we resolve that inquiry.10  Consequently, it 
is of little help here.11 
                                              
10 Holding otherwise, as the ARB did, would seem to 
foreclose the possibility that a statute could reference 
another provision without expressly saying so.  That, of 
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 Moreover, the Russello presumption is based on 
“[s]tatutory context,” Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, 
Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 728 (6th Cir. 2013), and “a 
hypothesis of careful draftsmanship.” Kapral, 166 F.3d at 
579 (Alito, J., concurring).  But that hypothesis is at least 
partially eroded by numerous examples of inexact 
drafting in § 20109.  See City of Columbus v. Ours 
Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 435-36 
(2002) (not following the Russello presumption, in part 
because of perceived drafting inconsistencies).  For 
example, faced with stronger arguments from the plain 
text of the statute than the DOL advances here, other 
federal courts have rejected railroads’ contentions that: 
(i) employees have no remedy if they fail to receive the 
                                                                                                     
course, is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.  See 
supra n.6. 
11 We do note that the Supreme Court invoked Russello 
in Burlington, while analyzing how an anti-retaliation 
provision interacted with its accompanying substantive 
provision.  See 548 U.S. at 63.  But the Court was not 
confronted with an argument (plausible or otherwise) that 
the two sections actually referred to each other, as we are 
here.  Moreover, the Supreme Court invoked Russello to 
support its conclusion that the anti-retaliation provision 
was meant to further the objectives of the substantive 
provision.  By contrast, here the DOL invokes Russello to 
drive a wedge between the two provisions. 
20 
 
medical treatment subsection (c)(1) entitles them to;12 
and (ii) railroads may bring disciplinary charges against 
employees who report accidents and safety violations.13 
C. 
 The basis for rejecting the DOL’s interpretation is 
not merely a presumption against it and the 
unpersuasiveness of the DOL’s textual arguments.  
Rather, a close examination of the statutory text 
affirmatively supports the conclusion that subsection 
(c)(2) is limited to addressing on-duty injuries.  See 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 
                                              
12 Delgado v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 12 C 2596, 2012 
WL 4854588, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2012) (rejecting 
the argument that there is no private right of action for a 
violation of subsection (c)(1)’s “deny, delay, or interfere” 
prohibition, because subsection (d)(1) creates only 
private rights of action for “discharge, discipline, or other 
discrimination”). 
13 Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 13-3730, 2014 WL 
5293704, at *2-3 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2014), (rejecting the 
argument that because bringing disciplinary charges was 
expressly defined as “discipline” for purposes of 
subsection (c), while not explicitly mentioned as a form 
of “discriminat[ion]” prohibited by subsections (a) and 
(b), that bringing such charges was not prohibited under 
subsections (a) and (b)), vacated and issue rendered 
moot, 2014 WL 7184747 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2014). 
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S. Ct. 1325, 1330-31 (2011) (“interpretation of [a] phrase 
[in an anti-retaliation provision] ‘depends upon reading 
the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and 
context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or 
authorities that inform the analysis.’”)  (quoting Dolan v. 
Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)).  Subsection 
(c) has two different segments (subsections (c)(1) and 
(c)(2)) which each provide similar protections to 
employees.  Moreover, one segment is expressly limited 
to matters work-related, while the other has no such 
explicit limitation.  Strikingly, the same is also true of 
subsection (b), making for an illuminating comparison: 
 (b) Hazardous safety or security conditions.— 
 (1) A railroad carrier engaged in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or an officer or employee 
of such a railroad carrier, shall not 
discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in 
any other way discriminate against an 
employee for— 
     (A) reporting, in good faith, a hazardous 
safety or security  condition; 
     (B) refusing to work when confronted by 
a hazardous safety or  security 
condition related to the performance of the 
 employee’s duties . . . 
22 
 
49 U.S.C. § 20109(b) (emphasis added). 
 The DOL contends, consistent with its approach to 
interpreting subsection (c)(2), that because there is no 
express qualification in subsection (b)(1)(A), an 
employee is protected for reporting any “hazardous 
safety or security condition.”  At oral argument the DOL 
was presented with a reductio ad absurdum:  a PATH 
employee, wearing a PATH sweatshirt, protests pollution 
at a power plant “entirely unrelated” to railroads, his 
conduct at that protest impugns PATH’s reputation (since 
he was wearing a PATH sweatshirt), and PATH 
disciplines him as a result.  The DOL, remaining 
consistent, responded that such discipline would violate 
subsection (b)(1)(A).  We cannot agree. 
 “[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and 
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have 
some purpose or object to accomplish.”  Pub. Citizen v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989) 
(quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 
1945) (Hand, J.)).  The purpose of the entirety of the 
FRSA is as obvious as it is express:  “to promote safety 
in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-
related accidents and incidents.”  49 U.S.C. § 20101.  
Accordingly, we think that subsection (b)(1)(A) must be 
read as having at least some work-related limitation, even 
though no such limitation appears on the face of the 
23 
 
statute.  And if a work-related limitation must be applied 
to subsection (b)(1)(A), it would be consistent to also 
apply a work-related limitation to subsection (c)(2). 
 Subsection (c)(2) itself also supports the 
conclusion that an on-duty limitation applies therein.  
Although not the portion directly at issue here, subsection 
(c)(2) protects employees who “request[] medical or first 
aid treatment.”  (emphasis added).  It seems unlikely that 
Congress was concerned about railroads disciplining 
employees for requesting medical treatment for off-duty 
injuries.14  Indeed, at oral argument, the DOL conceded 
that such a scenario was “unlikely as a practical matter” 
and could not articulate even a hypothetical situation 
where an employee would be disciplined for requesting 
medical treatment for an off-duty injury.15  If Congress 
                                              
14 Subsection (c)(2)’s title of “Prompt medical attention” 
also suggests an on-duty limitation, as it is difficult to 
imagine how railroads could be responsible for ensuring 
that employees who are injured off-duty receive prompt 
medical attention.  Cf. I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ 
Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (“The text’s 
generic reference to ‘employment’ should be read as a 
reference to the ‘unauthorized employment’ identified in 
the paragraph’s title.”). 
15 The DOL’s able counsel did suggest that an employee 
who is injured away from work, makes an appointment to 
consult with his physician about that injury but cannot 
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likely did not consider the application of the phrase 
“requesting medical or first aid treatment” in subsection 
(c)(2) to off-duty injuries, it is unlikely that Congress 
would have shifted course mid-sentence (without any 
textual indication) to have the phrase “orders or a 
treatment plan of a treating physician” apply  to off-duty 
injuries. 
D. 
 Although lacking in textual support, the DOL does 
provide a logical policy basis for how a broad 
interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would advance railroad 
safety.  The DOL argues that if subsection (c)(2) does not 
cover off-work injuries, employees may be “forc[ed] . . . 
to choose between violating employer attendance policies 
and compromising railroad safety by working while 
injured.”  Respondent’s Br. at 11.  Indeed, certain 
railroad employees “are engaged in [such] safety-
sensitive tasks,” that the Supreme Court has compared 
the safety implications of their performance to those 
“who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power 
facilities.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
                                                                                                     
work between the time the appointment is scheduled and 
the appointment itself, might be disciplined.  However, 
the employee’s inability to work would not be because of 




602, 628 (1989) (finding a compelling interest in 
subjecting such employees to suspicionless drug testing). 
 In passing the RSIA, Congress was clearly 
concerned about the safety implications of how 
employees perform their duties.  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 
20156 (requiring a “fatigue management plan” to be 
included as part of railroads’ risk reduction programs); 
49 U.S.C. § 20162 (requiring the Secretary of 
Transportation to establish “minimum training 
standards”); RSIA § 405 (requiring the Secretary of 
Transportation to study the safety impact of the use of 
cell phones and other potentially distracting electronic 
devices).  But all of these employee safety provisions are 
expressly limited to “safety-related railroad 
employees”—a term of art under the FRSA.16  These 
                                              
16 49 U.S.C. § 20102(4) provides: “‘safety-related 
railroad employee’ means-- 
(A) a railroad employee who is subject to [hours of 
service restrictions under] chapter 211; (B) another 
operating railroad employee who is not subject to chapter 
211; (C) an employee who maintains the right of way of 
a railroad; (D) an employee of a railroad carrier who is a 
hazmat employee as defined in section 5102(3) of this 
title; (E) an employee who inspects, repairs, or maintains 
locomotives, passenger cars, or freight cars; and (F) any 
other employee of a railroad carrier who directly affects 
railroad safety, as determined by the Secretary.” 
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provisions build on the longstanding commonsense 
recognition that only certain categories of railroad 
employees pose unique dangers if they work while 
impaired.17  Strikingly, subsection (c)(2) contains no such 
limitation, which means it may extend even to railroad 
accountants.  Had Congress intended to provide sick 
leave to workers in safety-sensitive positions in order to 
combat potential impairment, it likely would have placed 
a limit in subsection (c)(2) to that effect as it has 
regularly done when concerned about impaired railroad 
employees. 
                                              
17 The Hours of Service Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1415 
(March 4, 1907), limited the number of hours railroad 
employees could work, if they were “actually engaged in 
or connected with the movement of any train” and/or 
were an “operator, train dispatcher, or other employee 
who by the use of the telegraph or telephone dispatches, 
reports, transmits, receives, or delivers orders pertaining 
to or affecting train movements.”  The modern 
codification, 49 U.S.C. §§ 21101 – 21109 (“chapter 
211”), is expressly incorporated as a basis for 
determining who is a “safety-related employee,” under 
the FRSA.  See supra n.16.  The drug tests at issue in 
Skinner were also limited to these types of employees.  
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608 (“[t]he final regulations apply to 
employees assigned to perform service subject to the 
Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, as 
amended . . . .”). 
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 The alternative is that Congress meant to provide 
sick leave to all railroad employees.  Providing an entire 
industry’s workers a right to unlimited sick leave is a 
substantial policy undertaking, and we are unaware of 
any other federal laws conferring such a right on workers 
in any industry.18  Rather, the default rule under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., 
is that workers (regardless of industry) are provided with 
up to 12 weeks of sick leave every 12 months.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(1).  “Congress . . . does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague 
terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, 
hide elephants in mouseholes.”  Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  We are not 
prepared to assume that Congress decided to enact such a 
                                              
18 The DOL inaptly draws our attention to 49 U.S.C. § 
31105(a)(1)(B)—an anti-retaliation provision in the 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act—which is 
actually similar to § 20109(a)(2).  They each provide 
protections to transportation employees who refuse to 
violate safety-related laws or regulations.  While 
Department of Transportation regulations prohibit 
commercial drivers from operating a vehicle while “so 
impaired, or so likely to become impaired . . . as to make 
it unsafe for him/her to begin or continue to operate the 
commercial motor vehicle,” 49 C.F.R. § 392.3, the 
DOL’s interpretation of § 20109(c)(2) would give 
workers leave regardless of whether safety is implicated. 
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significant change by inserting an eleven-word sentence 
fragment between much more limited protections, from 
which such a change could be deduced.  “[I]t is highly 
unlikely that Congress . . . [made] a decision of such 
economic and political significance . . . in so cryptic a 
fashion.”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
E. 
 The DOL further suggests that the RSIA’s 
legislative history supports its position.  Although, in 
light of the foregoing analysis, “resort to the legislative 
history is . . . unnecessary to decide this case, our inquiry 
in that regard discloses no support for [the DOL]’s 
position.”  In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Subsection (c) was modeled on two similar state 
statutes which were held preempted by federal law in 
2007.19  Like subsection (c)(2), both statutes were broken 
                                              
19 See 610 Ill. Comp. Stat. 107/10, held preempted in 
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Box, 470 F. Supp. 2d 855 (C.D. Ill. 
2007); Minn. Stat. § 609.849, held partially preempted in 
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Swanson, No. 06-1013, 2007 WL 
1994042 (D. Minn. July 3, 2007) rev’d and held fully 
preempted, 533 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2008); The Impact of 
Railroad Injury, Accident, and Discipline Policies on the 
Safety of America’s Railroads: Hearings Before the H. 
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into two paragraphs:  a “deny, delay or interfere” 
paragraph, followed by a “discipline” paragraph.  In both 
state statutes, both paragraphs contained an “injured 
during the course of employment” limitation.  By 
contrast, in the federal version, only subsection (c)(1) has 
such a limitation.  The DOL, echoing its earlier 
arguments, contends that this is evidence of a deliberate 
choice by Congress.20 
 However, the DOL concedes that both of the state 
statutes and the federal hearings before the adoption of 
subsection (c) were focused on work-related injuries, and 
it has been unable to point to any express evidence that 
the policy it now advances was ever considered by 
                                                                                                     
Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 110th 
Cong. (Oct. 25, 2007). 
20 The DOL also points out that the initial House and 
Senate versions of what became subsection (c) were 
structured differently.  Compare H.R. 2095, 110th Cong. 
(Oct. 17, 2007) at 68-69 (§ 606) with S. 1889, 110th 
Cong. (Mar. 3, 2008) at 183 (§ 411).  However, we do 
not find this difference illuminating, and are not prepared 
to alter our conclusion regarding the statute’s meaning 
after “consideration of the Government’s highly 
speculative suggestions as to the meaning of the 
legislative history.”  United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 




anybody at any point in the legislative process.  Rather, 
because of the “broader safety purposes behind the 
statute,” the DOL asks us simply to assume that Congress 
would have wanted this result.  Aside from the separation 
of powers issues raised by that proposition, how do we 
know that Congress would not have been more 
concerned about potential safety issues caused by 
absenteeism, thus outweighing the potential benefits of 
the DOL’s stance?  We don’t—which is one reason why 
this Court does not formulate public policy. 
F. 
 The DOL argues that even if we do not agree that 
the statute necessarily extends to off-duty injuries, the 
ARB’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.  
But whether two different statutory provisions have the 
same scope “is a pure question of statutory construction 
for the courts to decide,” which warrants “[e]mploying 
traditional tools of statutory construction.”  I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).  “If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be 
given effect.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.  Only “if . . 
. the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue,” does the 
question become “whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843.  
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Employing traditional tools of statutory construction,21 
we have concluded that subsection (c)(2) applies only to 
on-duty injuries.  Accordingly, the ARB is not entitled to 
Chevron deference.22 
IV. 
 Having concluded that the Administrative Review 
Board misinterpreted the statute, we will grant the 
petition challenging the Board’s September 27, 2013 
order, and remand with instructions that the proceeding 
against Petitioner be dismissed.  
                                              
21 See City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 
1876 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (Such traditional 
tools include “the statute’s text, its context, the structure 
of the statutory scheme, and canons of textual 
construction[, which] are relevant in determining whether 
the statute is ambiguous . . . .”). 
22 We need not consider the separate argument that the 
ARB is not entitled to Chevron deference because 
rulemaking authority for the statute at issue has been 
delegated to the Secretary of Transportation.  See 49 
U.S.C. § 20103(a).  Nor need we consider the additional 
separate arguments that the unacknowledged 
inconsistencies between the decision below and Santiago 
undermine the ARB’s claim to Chevron deference and/or 
renders its decision arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
